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DOWNSIZING THE EUROZONE
INTO AN OCA OR ENTRY INTO
A FISCAL TRANSFER UNION
FRITZ BREUSS*
Last chance to stabilize the eurozone
Since May 2010, three member states of the eurozone
have already been supported by the EU rescue mea-
sures due to their indebtedness: Greece since May
2010, Ireland since November 2010 and Portugal
since May 2011. The most critical candidate is Greece.
While the situation in Ireland and Portugal appears to
be stabilizing after the implementation of austerity
measures, the Greek drama is continuing. The wors-
ening of the economic and political situation in
Greece during 2011 forced the partner countries of
the eurozone (shortly after the July 2011 package was
announced) to strengthen the rescue measures at two
consecutive Euro Summits (in October and Decem  -
ber) in the hope of making the preliminary ‘last’
attempt to fix the eurozone crisis. Although Greece
was the target of prime importance, the danger of
contagion to other EU periphery countries (e.g. Italy)
was increasingly a case that deserved attention.1
When talking about the current crisis, one should be
aware of the fact that there is no ‘euro crisis’ but a sov-
ereign debt crisis in some of the periphery eurozone
countries, in particular in Greece. The recession of
2009 triggered the debt crisis. Since the outbreak of
the crisis in early 2010, the euro-dollar exchange rate
has remained relatively stable in a band of 1.30 to
1.50.2 One reason can be seen in the fact that the euro
has increasingly gained power and established itself
asthe second world currency. In the last ten years, the
euro increased its share in global foreign exchange
reserves from 18 to 27 percent. Inversely, the share of
the US dollar shrank from 72 to 60 percent. Further
diversification of Chinas’ huge foreign reserves and
hence a shift from dollars to the euro could further
support the value of the euro in spite of the current
financial turbulences (see Breuss, Roeger and in’t Veld
2009).
At the December Euro Summit (see Euro Summit
2011B), the Heads of State or Government (HoSG)
of the euro area made a ‘final’ attempt to combat the
sovereign debt crisis by agreeing measures to move
towards a genuine ‘fiscal stability union’ (or an embry-
onic ‘fiscal union’) in the euro area (see also below).
Besides these longer-term reforms aimed at enhancing
economic policy coordination in the EU, some imme-
diate strategies to strengthen the stabilisation tools
were also announced at the earlier October Euro
Summit as short-term actions to address the current
financial market tensions (see Euro Summit 2011A).
These include: 
￿ Increase the firepower of the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF).3 An optimisation (lever-
aging) of the resources of the extended EFSF,
without expanding the guarantees underpinning
the facility to have a credit capacity of 440 billion
euros (by October 2011 approved by all parlia-
ments of the 17 euro member states). The leverage
effect should be up to 4 or 5, which is expected to
yield around 1 trillion euros. The terms and condi-
tions of the two concrete ‘leverage’ options (insur-
ance solution with 20–30 percent insurance quotas
and establishing a special purpose vehicle fund)
were worked out in detail by the EFSF and had
been agreed by the Eurogroup on 29 November
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1 According to simulations with the IMF Global Projections Model
(GPM), the macroeconomic impact on Europe in case of an ‘earth-
quake’ scenario would be considerable. A large financial shock that
spreads to the entire eurozone and a policy response that falls short,
would lead to large financial losses in the periphery which, in turn,
would result in banking problems throughout the eurozone.
Consequently, eurozone growth would fall by 2.5 percentage points
relative to the baseline, while global growth would fall by about
1 percent over 2011−12 (see IMF 2011).
2 Presently only 17 EU member states are members of the eurozone.
Nevertheless, due to a tight tie to the euro (either via currency boards
or voluntarily), the eurozone has at least four ‘shadow members’:
Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia and Lithuania. This implies an extended
eurozone of 21 member states, leaving out six countries: the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. These countries are more or less floating their currencies
vis-à-vis the euro.
3 The EFSF and from 2012the permanent ESM are new institution-
al arrangements outside the EU Treaty (in case of the ESM, Art. 136
TFEU was amended). The EFSF is (and the ESM will be) a
Luxembourg-registered company owned by eurozone member states
according to British Law.CESifo Forum 4/2011 6
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2011. Whether the planned Co-Investment Fund
(CIF, which would allow the combination of pub-
lic and private funding, will get enough response
by big international investors (Brazil, China,
Japan, Norway, etc.) is an open question. The ECB
is ready to act as an agent for the EFSF in its mar-
ket operations. The EFSF (see Euro Summit
2011B) will remain active parallel to the ESM
(European Stabilisation Mechanism) which is to
enter into force in July 2012 (instead of July 2013),
thus doubling the firepower (440 billion euros plus
500 billion euros).
￿ Adjustments to the ESM Treaty: the decisions
taken at the October Euro Summit (see Euro
Summit 2011A) concerning Greek debt (a ‘haircut’
of 50 percent on notional Greek debt held by pri-
vate investors – primarily banks – should secure
the decline of the Greek debt to GDP ratio to 120
percent by 2020, down from presently 186 percent)
are unique and exceptional. This is because this
‘voluntary measure’ proved to be a big mistake
because it unsettled the sovereign bond market in
Europe. Instead, standardised and identical
Collective Action Clauses (CAC) will be included
in the ESM. The voting rules in the ESM will be
changed to allow a qualified majority of 85 percent
in order to include an emergency procedure. 
￿ Additional financial resources: euro area member
states will consider additional resources for the
IMF of up to 200 billion euros in the form of bilat-
eral loans by the national central banks. However,
the US government may not support this pro-
gramme.
￿ The latest Greek rescue package: besides the agree-
ment of a haircut of Greek debt, the eurozone
leaders decided at the October Euro Summit that a
new EFSF-EU-IMF multiannual programme,
financing up to 100 billion euros, will be put in
place by the end of 2011, conditional on structural
reforms (see Euro Summit 2011A). This package
will replace those of July 2011, totalling 159 billion
euros (109 billion euros from EFS/IMF and 50 bil-
lion euros resulting from the haircut by bank par-
ticipation). Overall, the new Greek rescue package
amounts to 230 billion euros (euro area member
states will contribute up to 30 billion euros to the
Private Sector Involvement (PSI) package; the
haircut amounts up to 100 billion euros; the EFSF-
EU-IMF programme amounts to 100 billion
euros).
￿ Banking rescue packages: at the October Euro
Summit the eurozone leaders also agreed a com-
prehensive set of measures to raise confidence in
the banking sector by (i) facilitating access to term-
funding through a coordinated approach at EU
level and (ii) an increase in the capital position of
banks to 9 percent of core tier 1 by the end of June
2012 (Euro Summit 2011A). National supervisors
must ensure that the banks’ recapitalisation plans
do not lead to excess deleveraging (to avoid a ‘cred-
it squeeze’).
Following the proposals by Merkel and Sarkozy, the
leaders of the Eurogroup decided to embark on a ‘fis-
cal stability union’ by more strongly centralising fiscal
policy via a new ‘fiscal compact’ (see below). Due to
the absence of unanimity among the EU member
states (Britain vetoed the new measures), the new
rules cannot be implemented by primary legislation
(reform of the EU Treaties) but must be implemented
by an ‘international agreement’ to be signed in March
2012, again an intergovernmental action (see also
Euro Summit 2011B).
By these steps, the hitherto asymmetric economic pol-
icy design of EMU (centralized monetary policy com-
bined with a decentralized fiscal policy, coordinated
by the Stability and Growth Pact – SGP) is going to
become more symmetric. That means that the gap
between the philosophy of ‘one market, one money’ –
the basis of EMU – and the normal formula of a
functioning monetary union – ‘one country, one
money’ – will be filled in gradually by the newly
planned ‘fiscal stability union’. Nevertheless, the final
goal of a really functioning monetary union, which –
on the EU level – would imply a Political Union, still
lies far in the future.
A new fiscal compact aims at establishing a new fiscal
rule, containing the following elements (see Euro
Summit 2011B):
￿ The general government budget shall be balanced
or in surplus (like in the SGP); this principle shall
be deemed respected if the annual structural deficit
does not exceed 0.5 percent of nominal GDP.
￿ Such a rule (‘debt brake’) will be implemented in
the EU member states’ national legal systems at
constitutional or equivalent level. The rule will
contain an automatic correction mechanism that
shall be triggered in the event of deviation.
￿ The Court of Justice shall verify the implementa-
tion of this rule at national level.
￿ The EU member states shall converge towards
their specific reference level according to a calen-
dar proposed by the Commission.CESifo Forum 4/2011 7
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￿ The EU member states shall report ex ante their
national debt issuance plans.
￿ If the Commission recognises that a member state
breaches the 3 percent ceiling, there will be auto-
matic consequences unless a qualified majority of
euro area member states is opposed.4 Steps and
sanctions will be ruled by reversed majority voting
according to the new Sixpack rules of the SGP-III
that entered into force on 13 December 2011. In
addition, a numerical benchmark for debt reduc-
tion (1/20 rule) for member states with a govern-
ment debt in excess of 60 percent needs to be
enshrined in the new provisions.
￿ The eurozone leaders will examine the new rules
(directives) proposed by the Commission on
23 No  vem  ber 2011 on (i) monitoring and assess-
ment of draft budgetary plans and the correction
of excessive deficits in euro area member states and
(ii) the strengthening of economic and budgetary
surveillance of member states experiencing or
threatened by serious difficulties with respect to
their financial stability in the euro area (presently
the three countries under the rescue umbrella –
Greece, Ireland and Portugal; maybe also Italy).
￿ Euro area governance will be reinforced as agreed
at the Euro Summit of 26 October 2011. In partic-
ular, regular Euro Summits will be held at least
twice a year.
The whole set of new rules in this new ‘fiscal compact’
outside the EU Treaty raises many legal questions
(e.g. are automatic sanctions legally binding; which
competence is given to the Court of Justice to inter-
vene in national budgets; which role does the
Commission play) that should be clarified by the
European Commission by March 2012.
Here for the more medium and long-term reorganiza-
tion of economic governance (sometimes called ‘EU
government’ in EMU), a number of measures are
already in force or in the pipeline (see Breuss 2011;
Buti 2011). This enhanced governance should foster
fiscal discipline (by the enhanced SGP within the legal
measures in the Sixpack; the European Semester; the
intergovernmental agreement of the HoSG in the
Euro Plus Pact) and deeper integration in the internal
market as well as stronger growth (by the agenda of
Europe 2020), enhanced competitiveness (two new
regulations concerning the surveillance and correc-
tion of macroeconomic imbalances in the Sixpack)
and social cohesion (new targets in the structural pol-
icy). Additionally, a European System of Financial
Supervisory (ESFS) with three new European Super  -
visory Authorities (ESAs: EBA, London, EIOPA,
Frankfurt, ESMA, Paris5) – already in place since
January 2011 – should secure better governance of the
financial sector in Europe.
The question arises whether all these heterogeneous
measures and initiatives on EU level or outside the
EU Treaty really meet the needs to cure the causes of
the current crisis in Europe. In the following we shall
try to confront the causes and cures of the euro crisis
in a theoretical framework based on earlier ideas of
the ‘optimum currency area’ (OCA) theory.
From an economically optimal to a politically 
suboptimal EMU
Two major causes – partly interrelated – of the pre-
sent crisis in the eurozone can be identified:
￿ Diverging competitiveness: competitiveness, mea-
sured by relative unit labour costs (ULC) of euro-
zone countries to the eurozone average, drifted
apart in the last decade. Germany and Austria
steadily improved the countries’ cost competitive-
ness since the inception of EMU, whereas in the
periphery countries Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece
and Spain (PIIGS the competitive position) deteri-
orated.
￿ Indebtedness: public debt increased dramatically in
the PIIGS countries, in particular in Greece. When
countries surpass the benchmark of ‘sustainability’
spreads on newly issued government bonds (also
followed by a downgrading by rating agencies),
they are in danger of potential default. In this case
only bail-out mechanism by the eurozone partners
can avoid default.
The implications of these two causes of the present
eurozone crisis may be discussed with the help of
Figure 1, a generalization of the usual graphical
treatment of the traditional and/or endogenous
OCA theory (see Breuss 2006). The generalized
OCA theory of Figure 1 consists of four quadrants
with interrelated states of integration in an econom-
ic OCA and its deviations due to the shocks of the
present crisis in the eurozone. The combination of
4 The ‘automatic’ sanctions would, however, require a change of
Article 126 TFEU that determines the excessive deficit procedure. If
a eurozone member state breaches the rules, sanctions could have no
legal basis.
5 EBA = European Banking Authority; EIOPA = European In  -
surance and Occupational Pensions Authority; ESMA = European
Securities and Markets Authority.CESifo Forum 4/2011 8
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the numbers 1 in the four quadrants defines equilib-
rium of an economic OCA. Those of the numbers 2
describe a situation of the present politically created
eurozone which can only survive by embarking on a
fiscal transfer union.
Quadrant I (upper left side) represents the relation-
ships between real divergence (or alternatively, the
increasing failure to form a ‘European business cycle’
because the economies of the eurozone member states
become more and more heterogeneous) and trade
integration (T) in the eurozone.
(i) First we have the European Commission’s optimistic
view of EMU. There is a downward sloping line
(TT) because as trade integration (T) increases, the
degree of economic divergence between the euro-
zone countries declines. The upward sloping line
(OCA) says that more divergence makes EMU
more costly (or the costs surpass the benefits).
More trade integration reduces these costs. Thus,
an increase in real divergence must be compensated
by more trade integration to make benefits surpass
the costs of EMU. Points on the OCA line are
combinations of divergence and integration for
which EMU has zero net gains. In the upper area
of quadrant I we find countries that, in economic
terms, would be sustainable candidates for EMU
(the OCA zone). In hindsight, one must confess
that only a small group of countries would belong
to the OCA zone. The fact that the EU had, for
political reasons, created a large
EMU instead of an economically
sustainable OCA was emphasized
by several studies before 1999.
The small OCA would have con-
sisted of the countries belonging
to the former DM bloc (EUR-
DM: Austria, Bel  gi  um, France,
Germany, Luxem  bourg and the
Nether  lands) and eventually also
Fin  land. In any case, the present
com  position of the eurozone with
17 member states (EUR17) does
not form an OCA. Many mem-
bers of the politically formed
EMU were not able to adapt to
the new situation of a single cur-
rency by increasing their ULC.
They could not compensate for
the loss of the instrument of cur-
rency depreciation, formerly used
often to improve competitiveness.
In Figure 1, EUR17 therefore lies outside the OCA
zone. In this context, one must also state that the
forecasts made by the so-called endogenous OCA
theory seem to be falsified by the eurozone perfor-
mance of the last decade. The hope has been dis-
appointed that membership in the eurozone and
the promise of increased intra-eurozone trade
would automatically lead to less heterogeneity and
hence to an urgently needed ‘European business
cycle’.
(ii) Second, Krugman’s pessimistic view of EMU could
have dominated the most recent performance of
EMU. This view is represented by the upward
sloping TK line. According to Krugman (derived
from experience in some regions of the United
States), more trade integration could lead to more
specialization and hence to increasingly removing
countries from the OCA zone. Besides the lack of
adjustment, this argument could somehow explain
the drifting apart of competitiveness in the euro-
zone. Empirical evidence is scarce, however.
Indirect evidence may be found in most recent
regional studies (see EU 2011A and 2011B), which
identify the periphery countries of the EU as
extremely vulnerable concerning globalisation as
they are supplying products in international trade
with RCA values concentrated in agricultural
products and low-tech categories.
Quadrant II (upper right side) represents the relation-
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(€-MS default) and financial integration (FI) in the
eurozone. This quadrant represents the second cause
of the present eurozone crisis.
(i) First there is the optimistic view of EMU. The line
(FI) is downward sloping because, as financial
market integration (FI) increases, the probability
of eurozone countries’ sovereign defaults declines.
The upward sloping line (OCA) says that the more
eurozone countries are moving towards default,
the more the costs of EMU surpass the benefits.
An increase in the number of eurozone countries
being in sovereign default must be compensated by
increased financial integration. In the upper area
of quadrant II we find countries that, in financial
and fiscal terms, are sustainable candidates for
EMU (the OCA zone). Again, the former DM
bloc (EUR-DM) countries would belong to this
area, whereas the present EUR17 group lies out-
side the OCA zone. One reason may be that the
low interest rates after entering EMU has led to a
misallocation of funds and to debt-financed
spending in the private and public sectors. Due to
lax control by EU institutions and hence the disre-
gard of SGP rules, some eurozone member states
have accumulated debt-to-GDP ratios far above
the sustainability level – not least Greece.
(ii)Second, we can also interpret the present crisis
with a pessimistic view of EMU. In the aftermath
of the recession of 2009 and after the declaration
that Greece had faked its fiscal statistics (for the
second time), the spreads of government bonds
(vis-à-vis German 10-year bonds) exploded and –
simultaneously – Greek bonds were downgraded
by the rating agencies. The process started with
Greece and was followed by the other PIIGS
countries. Whereas during the ‘fair-weather’ peri-
od of EMU (from 1999 to 2007) the government
bonds of all euro area countries exhibited near-
zero spreads, they started to diverge in 2008,
implying different default risks. Before the start
of EMU, the spreads of the PIIGS had also
diverged considerably, mainly due to exchange
rate risks. The situation of a weakly integrated
financial market (in particular concerning gov-
ernment bonds) is represented by the upward
sloping FISP line. In the so-called ‘fair-weather’
phase of EMU, banks financed budget deficits of
eurozone member states under the pretext that all
government bonds (those of Greece and Ger  -
many alike) would have the same risk. These
financing activities were reinforced by the fact
that under Basel II (and also under Basel III)
rules, government bonds must not be secured
with core tier 1 capital.
The eurozone crisis has brought to light the fact that
the present composition of the EUR17 group is (at
least economically) not an OCA. In order to come to
grips with this situation one can follow two options:
(i) either the eurozone is re-dimensioned, i.e. some of
the problem countries temporarily leave the eurozone6
or (ii) a fiscal transfer union is started. In the first
case, eurozone members will re-introduce their
national currencies and improve their competitiveness
by depreciation. After having reformed their
economies and having reduced their public debt, they
could re-join EMU. In the second case, the EUR17
zone becomes a permanent fiscal transfer union,
which was not intended in the Maastricht Treaty,
manifested in the ‘no-bail out’ clause of Article 125
TFEU. The several rescue plans for Greece (not to
forget those for Ireland and Portugal) indicate that
politically the most likely outcome is the fiscal trans-
fer union.7 Initial steps in this direction were made by
the announcement of creating a ‘fiscal stability union’
(see Euro Summit 2011B). In Figure 1, the bail-out
actions of the eurozone member states via
EFSF/ESM would shift the OCA line towards the left
(in quadrant I) and to the right (in quadrant II) to the
new OCA’ line. If that were the political intention, the
present EUR17 group would also belong to the OCA
zone.
Quadrant III (lower right side) represents the relation-
ship between potential default of eurozone countries
(€-MS default) and competitiveness. An improvement
of the latter may come about by reducing unit labour
costs (ULC) and hence improving the current account
(CA) and/or by depreciating the euro against the US
dollar or other currencies.
(i) First we deal with the optimistic view of EMU.
There is a downward sloping fiscal stability line
(FS), i.e. the situation where eurozone member
states would follow the SGP rules. Sovereign
default can be mitigated or overcome by increasing
competitiveness and hence stimulating economic
6 For the time being, the Lisbon Treaty (Article 50 TFEU) only
allows an exit from the EU and hence also from the eurozone but not
an exit solely from the eurozone. Therefore we would need a new
Article 50a TFEU which allows the temporary exit only of the euro-
zone.
7 In a future ‘new EU’ with a revised EU Treaty one could also think
of a ‘fiscal transfer union’ consisting of the ESM (which could be
transformed into a European Monetary Fund – EMF) to intervene
temporarily in acute debt problems and a permanent ‘fiscal federal-
ism’ à la the United States and Canada which automatically balances
budgetary disequilibria between eurozone member states during the
business cycle.CESifo Forum 4/2011 10
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growth. The upward sloping line (OCA) says that
the more eurozone countries are moving towards
default the more the costs of EMU will surpass
their benefits. Increasing competitiveness can com-
pensate fiscal unsustainability. In the lower area of
quadrant III there are countries that would be, in
competitiveness and fiscal terms, sustainable can-
didates for EMU (the OCA zone). Again we see a
switch from the former DM bloc countries (EUR-
DM) belonging to the OCA zone to the present
EUR17 country group which is outside the OCA
zone with a high potential of default (the outlier is
Greece) combined with low competitiveness.
(ii) Second, we can interpret the present crisis situa-
tion with a pessimistic or realistic view of EMU. In
spite of the implementation of the SGP in 1997
and its first reform in 2005, there were always
some countries (in 2003–2004 France and
Germany did not comply with the SGP rules) that
did not fulfil the rules of the SGP. In the ‘fair
weather’ period of EMU (1999–2007) this did not
very much hamper the eurozone because the rates
on government bonds of all eurozone member
states were pretty much the same. Only since the
recession of 2009 has public debt exploded and
hence also the spreads of government bonds – in
particular in the PIIGS. The usual suspects with
debt-to-GDP ratios far above the 60 percent
benchmark were always Belgium, Greece and
Italy. Belgium was able to reduce its ratio from
114 percent in 1999 to 84 percent in 2007. After the
crisis it increased again to an expected 99 percent
in 2012. In Italy, the debt-to-GDP ratio was
114 percent in 1999 and was then reduced to
103 percent in 2007. After the crisis it increased
again to an expected 120 percent in 2012. Greece
entered EMU in 2001 with faked fiscal figures and
a debt-to-GDP ratio of 104 percent. Whereas
other countries reduced their levels during the ‘fair
weather’ period of EMU, in Greece the debt-to-
GDP ratio increased to 107 percent in 2007. Since
then it has exploded und will reach 199 percent in
2012/2013. The violation of the SGP rules in euro-
zone member states over time is represented by an
upward sloping fiscal non-sustainability line (FS’).
Even improvements in competitiveness are associ-
ated with an increased probability of debt levels
that are not sustainable.8
Quadrant IV (lower left side) closes the general picture
of the extended OCA theory. It represents the rela-
tionship between real divergence and competitiveness.
(i) First we start with the optimistic or natural view of
EMU. There is a downward sloping macroeco-
nomic (international) balance line (MBA), i.e. all
combinations of real divergence and competive-
ness which lead to a balanced current account.
Real divergence can be overcome and/or improve-
ments towards a ‘European business cycle’ can be
realised by increasing competitiveness. The up  -
ward sloping line (OCA) says that the more
economies of the eurozone countries drift away
from what would be a ‘European business cycle’,
the more the costs of EMU surpass the benefits.
Increasing competitiveness can offset real diver-
gencies. In the lower area of quadrant IV we have
countries which would ideally form an EMU
because their economies move together and they
are competitive (OCA zone). Again we see a
switch from the former DM bloc countries (EUR-
DM) belonging to the OCA zone to the present
group of EUR17 countries which lies outside the
OCA zone.
(ii) Second, there is again the pessimistic or realistic
view of EMU if the years since the recession of
2009 are considered. In some countries the real
divergence cannot be overcome even through
increasing competitiveness (due to the Krugman
effect of specialization). This is represented by the
upward sloping macroeconomic (international)
imbalances line (IMBA). Two new directives of
the Sixpack are targeting the imbalance problems
in the eurozone. Macroeconomic imbalances have
been neglected so far, although they are the second
major reason – besides indebtedness – of the cur-
rent eurozone crisis.
As already discussed in the context of quadrants I and
II, we are confronted with the basic question: do we
go back to the roots of (economic) OCA criteria that
would involve a re-dimensioning or downsizing of the
eurozone or must we come to live in a fiscal transfer
union in the future? The present rescue activities
speak a clear language: the second option is the most
probable. In Figure 1 the bail-out actions of the euro-
zone member states via EFSF/ESM shift the OCA
line towards the right (in quadrant III) and to the left
(in quadrant IV) to the new OCA’ lines. By this polit-
ical will the present EUR17 group would also belong
to the OCA zone, artificially and politically but not
economically.
8 After the recession of 2009 in 23 EU member states, excessive
deficit procedures (EDP) were initiated by the European
Commission (Greece was excluded as a special case); only in four
countries – Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden – no EDP
was necessary. In 22 out of the 23 EU countries the EDPs were
stopped temporarily because of the present crisis.CESifo Forum 4/2011 11
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Europe à deux vitesses due to the eurozone crisis
The ‘Greek crisis’ is a superb example of the validity
of the ‘butterfly effect’ in the chaos theory: the indebt-
edness of a small country (the flap of a butterfly’s
wing on the Acropolis) holds the whole eurozone
hostage (sets off a Tornado in Europe). Although the
economic weight of Greece, measured by its share of
eurozone GDP (2.5 percent) and by its intra-eurozone
trade potential (1.5 percent) is negligible, the debt cri-
sis in this country has profound implications for the
eurozone. Firstly, because European banks financed
the Greek public debt and secondly, the financial
(bond) market integration poses the risk of contagion
by other PIIGS countries. Ireland (due to its banking
problems after the Lehman disaster) and Portugal
had already to be rescued by assistance of EFSF, EU
and IMF. Italy and Spain have problems in financing
their public debt because of increasing spreads for
their bonds and because now the rating agencies are
taking a keener view on the fiscal performance of
these countries.
In addition to its economic and financial implications
in Europe, the debt crisis in the eurozone has had
already considerable political collateral damage. In six
eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain and Slovakia) either the national parliaments
were dissolved and/or the heads of state (prime minis-
ters) had to resign. In Greece and Italy overwhelmed
politicians have been replaced by technocrats.
Academ  ic economists have become prime ministers.
In light of the feeble and instable political environ-
ment in Greece and Italy after the collapse of the gov-
ernments, the future of the eurozone is gloomy. It
appears that there are only two extreme options: 
(i) A breakdown of the eurozone: this scenario could
materialize if a large founding member state like
Italy were penalized by the financial markets by
excessively high interest rates on government
bonds which would make it impossible to refi-
nance the public debt. In this case even the lever-
aged EFSF would be too weak to bailout Italy. If
Italy falls, the eurozone in its present composition
is dead. A reduction to the EUR-DM zone would
become plausible.
(ii) Two-speed Europe or two Europes: this scenario is
most likely and a consequence of the numerous
bail-out activities starting with the Greek crisis,
then continuing with the rescue measures in case
of Ireland and Portugal. Due to the urgency, many
actions of the eurozone partner countries were ad
hoc and outside the EU Treaty, some are designed
within the EU Treaty and will improve economic
governance of the EU in the future.
In any case, the future strengthening of European
integration will now take place within the eurozone,
widening the gap between ins and outs. The eurozone
crisis made it necessary to act quickly (intergovern-
mental) and ad hoc, and to break many legal taboos.
Because the crisis affected one of the eurozone mem-
ber states, the rescue measures were taken and
financed only by the eurozone member states:9
￿ Bail-outs: the bail-out activities of EFSF/ESM are
and will be executed outside the EU Treaty (only
ESM will be sanctioned by an amendment to Art.
136 TFEU). Both bodies are companies organized
by British law in Luxembourg. The contracting
parties and hence financiers are only eurozone
member states. 
￿ Euro-Plus Pact (EPP): the same is true of the
Euro-Plus Pact activities of the HoSG of the euro-
zone. This pact is organized by a gentlemen agree-
ment in a purely intergovernmental way. Members
of the EPP are 17 eurozone member states plus six
non-eurozone countries.
￿ ‘Euro economic government’: due to the absence of
unanimity (because of Britain’s veto) at the De  -
cem  ber Euro Summit (Euro Summit 2011B), the
reform of the EU Treaty had to be circumvented
by an ‘international agreement’ among the 17 euro-
zone member states which may also be followed by
non-euro member states. After this intergovern-
mental interregnum, the eurozone leaders hope to
be able to implement the new rules into primary
legislation (a new EU Treaty) later. Again the lead-
ers of the eurozone are starting with a new ‘fiscal
compact’ that should lead to a ‘fiscal stability
union’ with new fiscal rules (‘debt brake’) imple-
mented in national constitutions, surveillance by
the Court of Justice and the right to intervene in
national budgetary sovereignty and (quasi)-auto-
matic sanctions. Some elements of this new fiscal
pact are already implemented in the reformed SGP
within the Sixpack which became effective on
13 December 2011. Also within the budgetary sur-
veillance procedure of the ‘European Semester’,
the direct budget control by EU institutions has
already been executed and in some of the PIIGS
9 The only forward strategy encompassing all EU-27 member states
is ‘Europe 2020’, a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth. This medium-term strategy should not least also foster com-
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the budgetary sovereignty has been reduced even
further. In the three eurozone countries under the
rescue umbrella – Greece, Ireland and Portugal –
the ‘Troika’ (experts of the European Commission,
the ECB and the IMF) is monitoring regularly
(each quarter) their budgetary plans. That means
that these countries are already suffering a loss in
their budgetary sovereignty (weakening of the
‘king’s right’ of national parliaments as the
Germans like to say). After the G20 summit in
Cannes (3–4 November 2011) Italy also stands
(preventatively) under the budgetary supervision of
the European Commission and the IMF.
Whereas the above mentioned measures are changing
the economic governance of the eurozone outside the
EU Treaty, hence intergovernmental, the other initia-
tives in the wake of the Greek crisis target a redesign
and strengthening of economic governance (better co-
ordination) or sometimes named ‘EU economic gov-
ernment’ by the reform steps in the Sixpack, Europe
2020 and financial supervisions. These activities are
covered by the EU Treaty and therefore cover all
27 EU member states. This is the usual Community
method. Whether the approach to deal with the cur-
rent crisis is intergovernmental (this is adequate in the
short term because it allows a faster response to the
fast acting financial markets) or by the Community
method (which is more democratically founded but
takes more time to be implemented, all new EU or
eurozone activities aim at avoiding a new Greek cata-
strophe in the future. The price might be a division of
the EU into a ‘two-speed Europe’. But in any case,
after this crisis we will have a new EU.
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